A multihomed node may have multiple provisioning domains (via physical and/or virtual interfaces). For example, a node may be simultaneously connected to a wired Ethernet LAN, an 802.11 LAN, a 3G cell network, one or multiple VPN connections, or one or multiple tunnels (automatic or manual). Current laptops and smartphones typically have multiple access network interfaces and, thus, are often connected to different provisioning domains.
A multihomed node receives configuration information from each of its attached networks, through various mechanisms such as DHCPv4 [RFC2131] , DHCPv6 [RFC3315] , PPP [RFC1661] , and IPv6 Router Advertisements [RFC4861] . Some received configuration objects are specific to an interface, such as the IP address and the link prefix. Others are typically considered by implementations as being global to the node, such as the routing information (e.g., default gateway), DNS server IP addresses, and address selection policies, herein referred to as "node-scoped".
When the received node-scoped configuration objects have different values from each provisioning domain, such as different DNS server IP addresses, different default gateways, or different address selection policies, the node has to decide which one to use or how it will merge them.
Other issues are the result of simultaneous attachment to multiple networks, such as addressing and naming space overlaps, regardless of the provisioning mechanism.
The following sections define the multiple interfaces (MIF) node and the scope of this work, describe related work, list issues, and then summarize the underlying problems.
A companion document, [RFC6419] , discusses some current practices of various implementations dealing with MIF. 
Scope and Existing Work
This section describes existing related work and defines the scope of the problem.
Interactions Below IP
Some types of interfaces have link-layer characteristics that may be used in determining how multiple provisioning domain issues will be dealt with. For instance, link layers may have authentication and encryption characteristics that could be used as criteria for interface selection. However, network discovery and selection on lower layers as defined by [RFC5113] is out of scope of this document. Moreover, interoperability with lower-layer mechanisms such as services defined in IEEE 802.21, which aims at facilitating handover between heterogeneous networks [MIH] , is also out of scope. When an application is using one interface while another interface with better characteristics becomes available, the ongoing application session could be transferred to the newly enabled interface. However, in some cases, the ongoing session shall be kept on the current interface while initiating the new session on the new interface. The problem of interface selection is within the MIF scope and may leverage specific node functions (Section 3.8).
However, if transfer of an IP session is required, IP mobility mechanisms, such as [RFC6275] , shall be used. 
Session Management
Some implementations, especially in the mobile world, rely on a higher-level session manager, also called a connection manager, to deal with issues brought by simultaneous attachment to multiple provisioning domains. Typically, the session manager may deal with the selection of the interface, and/or the provisioning domain, on behalf of the applications, or tackle complex issues such as how to resolve conflicting policies (Section 4.3). As discussed in Section 3.7, the session manager may encounter difficulties because of multiple and diverse criteria.
Session managers usually leverage the link-layer interface to gather information (e.g., lower-layer authentication and encryption methods; see Section 3.1) and/or for control purposes. Such a link-layer interface may not provide all required services to make a proper decision (e.g., interface selection). Some OSes or terminals already implement session managers [RFC6419] , and vendor-specific platforms sometimes provide a specific sockets API (Section 3.9) that a session manager can use. However, the generic architecture of a session manager and its associated API are not currently standardized, so session manager behavior may differ between OSes and platforms. Other APIs have been defined to solve issues similar to MIF. For instance, [RFC5014] defines an API to influence the default address selection mechanism by specifying attributes of the source addresses it prefers. [RFC6316] gives another example, in a multihoming context, by defining a sockets API enabling interactions between applications and the multihoming shim layer for advanced locator management, and access to information about failure detection and path exploration.
MIF Issues
This section describes the various issues when using a MIF node that has already received configuration objects from its various provisioning domains, or when multiple interfaces are used and result in wrong domain selection, addressing, or naming space overlaps. They occur, for example, when:
1. one interface is on the Internet and one is on a corporate private network. The latter may be through VPN.
2. one interface is on one access network (i.e., WiFi) and the other one is on another access network (3G) with specific services.
DNS Resolution Issues
A MIF node (M1) has an active interface (I1) connected to a network (N1), which has its DNS servers (S1 as primary DNS server) and another active interface (I2) connected to a network (N2), which has its DNS servers (S2 as primary DNS server). S1 serves some private namespace, "private.example.com". The user or the application uses a name "a.private.example.com", which is within the private namespace of S1 and only resolvable by S1. Any of the following situations may occur:
1. The M1 stack, based on its routing table, uses I2 to reach S1 to resolve "a.private.example.com". M1 never reaches S1. The name is not resolved.
2. M1 keeps only one set of DNS server addresses from the received configuration objects. Let us assume that M1 keeps S2's address as the primary DNS server. M1 sends the forward DNS query for a.private.example.com to S2. S2 responds with an error for a nonexistent domain (NXDOMAIN). The name is not resolved. This issue also arises when performing a reverse DNS lookup. In the same situation, the reverse DNS query fails.
3. M1 keeps only one set of DNS server addresses from the received configuration objects. Let us assume that M1 keeps S2's address. M1 sends the DNS query for a.private.example.com to S2. S2 queries its upstream DNS and gets an IP address for a.private.example.com. However, the IP address is not the same one that S1 would have given. Therefore, the application tries to connect to the wrong destination node, or to the wrong interface, which may imply security issues or result in lack of service.
4. S1 or S2 has been used to resolve "a.private.example.com" to an [RFC1918] address. Both N1 and N2 are [RFC1918]-addressed networks. If addresses overlap, traffic may be sent using the wrong interface. This issue is not related to receiving multiple configuration objects, but to an address overlap between interfaces or attaching networks.
5. M1 has resolved a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) to a locally valid IP address when connected to N1. If the node loses connection to N1, the node may try to connect, via N2, to the same IP address as earlier, but as the address was only locally valid, connection setup fails. Similarly, M1 may have received NXDOMAIN for an FQDN when connected to N1. After detachment from N1, the node should not assume the FQDN continues to be nonexistent on N2.
Blanchet & Seite Informational [Page 10]
6. M1 requests a AAAA record from a DNS server on a network that uses protocol translators and DNS64 [RFC6147] . If M1 receives a synthesized AAAA record, it is guaranteed to be valid only on the network from which it was learned. If M1 uses synthesized AAAA on any other network interface, traffic may be lost, dropped, or forwarded to the wrong network.
Some networks require the user to authenticate on a captive web portal before providing Internet connectivity. If this redirection is achieved by modifying the DNS reply, specific issues may occur. Consider a MIF node (M1) with an active interface (I1) connected to a network (N1), which has its DNS server (S1), and another active interface (I2) connected to a network (N2), which has its DNS server (S2). Until the user has not authenticated, S1 is configured to respond to any A or AAAA record query with the IP address of a captive portal, so as to redirect web browsers to an access control portal web page. This captive portal can be reached only via I1. When the user has authenticated to the captive portal, M1 can resolve an FQDN when connected to N1. However, if the address is only locally valid on N1, any of the issues described above may occur. When the user has not authenticated, any of the following situations may occur:
1. M1 keeps only one set of DNS server addresses from the received configuration objects and kept S2 address. M1 sends the forward DNS query for a.example.com to S2. S2 responds with the correct answer, R1. M1 attempts to contact R1 by way of I1. The connection fails. Or, the connection succeeds, bypassing the security policy on N1, possibly exposing the owner of M1 to prosecution.
2. M1 keeps only one set of DNS server addresses from the received configuration objects and kept S1 address. M1 sends the DNS query for a.example.com to S1. S1 provides the address of its captive portal. M1 attempts to contact this IP address using I1. The application fails to connect, resulting in lack of service. Or, the application succeeds in connecting but connects to the captive portal rather than the intended destination, resulting in lack of service (i.e., an IP connectivity check issue, as described in Section 4.4). 2. For the IP1 address family, M1 has one default route (R1, R2) per network (N1, N2). IP1 is reachable by both networks, but the N2 path has better characteristics, such as better round-trip time, least cost, better bandwidth, etc. These preferences could be defined by the user, provisioned by the network operator, or otherwise appropriately configured. The M1 stack uses R1 and tries to send through I1. IP1 is reached, but the service would be better via I2.
3. For the IP1 address family, M1 has a default route (R1), a specific X.0.0.0/8 route R1B (for example, but not restricted to an [RFC1918] prefix) to N1, and a default route (R2) to N2. IP1 is reachable by N2 only, but the prefix (X.0.0.0/8) is used in both networks. Because of the most specific route R1B, the M1 stack sends packets through I2, and those packets never reach the target.
A MIF node may have multiple routes to a destination. However, by default, it does not have any hint concerning which interface would be the best to use for that destination. The first-hop selection may leverage on local routing policy, allowing some actors (e.g., network operator or service provider) to influence the routing table, i.e., make a decision regarding which interface to use. For instance, a user on such a multihomed node might want a local policy to influence which interface will be used based on various conditions. Some Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) have defined policy-based routing selection mechanisms. For instance, the Access Network Discovery and Selection Function (ANDSF) [TS23.402] provides inter-system routing policies to terminals with both a 3GPP interface and non-3GPP interfaces. However, the routing selection may still be difficult, due to disjoint criteria as discussed in Section 3.8. Moreover, information required to make the right decision may not be available. For instance, interfaces to a lower layer may not provide all required hints concerning the selection (e.g., information on interface quality).
A node usually has a node-scoped routing table. However, a MIF node is connected to multiple provisioning domains; if each of these domains pushes routing policies to the node, then conflicts between policies may happen, and the node has no easy way to merge or reconcile them.
On a MIF node, some source addresses are not valid if used on some interfaces. For example, an [RFC1918] source address might be appropriate on the VPN interface but not on the public interface of the MIF node. If the source address is not chosen appropriately, then packets may be filtered in the path if source address filtering is in place ( [RFC2827] , [RFC3704] ), and reply packets may never come back to the source.
Conflicting Policies
The distribution of configuration policies (e.g., address selection, routing, DNS selection) to end nodes is being discussed (e.g., ANDSF in [TS23.402], [DHCPv6-ROUTE-OPTIONS]). If implemented in multiple provisioning domains, such mechanisms may conflict and create issues for the multihomed node. Considering a MIF node (M1) with an active interface (I1) connected to a network (N1) and another active interface (I2) connected to a network (N2), the following conflicts may occur:
1. M1 receives from both networks (N1 and N2) an update of its default address selection policy. However, the policies are specific to each network. The policies are merged by the M1 stack. Based on the merged policy, the chosen source address is from N1, but packets are sent to N2. The source address is not reachable from N2; therefore, the return packet is lost. Merging address selection policies may have important impacts on routing.
2. A node usually has a node-scoped routing table. However, each of the connected provisioning domains (N1 and N2) may push routing policies to the node; conflicts between policies may then happen, and the node has no easy way to merge or reconcile them.
3. M1 receives from one of the networks an update of its access selection policy, e.g., via the 3GPP/ANDSF [TS23.402]. However, the policy is in conflict with the local policy (e.g., userdefined or default OS policy). Assuming that the network provides a list of overloaded access networks, if the policy sent by the network is ignored, the packet may be sent to an access network with poor quality of communication.
Session Management
Consider that a node has selected an interface and managed to configure it (i.e., the node obtained a valid IP address from the network). However, Internet connectivity is not available. The problem could be due to the following reasons:
1. The network requires a web-based authentication (e.g., the access network is a WiFi hot spot). In this case, the user can only access a captive portal. For instance, the network may perform HTTP redirection or modify DNS behavior (Section 4.1) until the user has not authenticated.
2. The IP interface is configured as active, but Layer 2 is so poor (e.g., poor radio condition) that no Layer 3 traffic can succeed.
In this situation, the session manager should be able to perform IP connectivity checks before selecting an interface.
Session issues may also arise when the node discovers a new provisioning domain. Consider a MIF node (M1) with an active interface (I1) connected to a network (N1) where an application is running a TCP session. A new network (N2) becomes available. If N2 is selected (e.g., because of better quality of communication), M1 gets IP connectivity to N2 and updates the routing table priority. So, if no specific route to the correspondent node is in place, and if the node implements the weak host model [RFC1122] , the TCP connection breaks as the next hop changes. In order to continue communicating with the correspondent node, M1 should try to reconnect to the server via N2. In some situations, it could be preferable to maintain current sessions on N1 while new sessions start on N2.
Single Interface on Multiple Provisioning Domains
When a node using a single interface is connected to multiple networks, such as different default routers, similar issues to those described above will happen. Even with a single interface, a node may wish to connect to more than one provisioning domain: that node may use more than one IP source address and may have more than one default router. The node may want to access services that can only be reached using one of the provisioning domains. In this case, it needs to use the right outgoing source address and default gateway to reach that service. In this situation, that node may also need to use different DNS servers to get domain names in those different provisioning domains. 
Underlying Problems and Causes
This section lists the underlying problems, and their causes, that lead to the issues discussed in the previous section. The problems can be divided into five categories: 1) configuration, 2) DNS resolution, 3) routing, 4) address selection, and 5) session management and APIs. They are shown below:
1. Configuration. In a MIF context, configuration information specific to a provisioning domain may be ignored because:
A. Configuration objects (e.g., DNS servers, NTP servers) are node-scoped. So, the IP stack is not able to maintain the mapping between configuration information and the corresponding provisioning domain.
B. The same configuration objects (e.g., DNS server addresses, NTP server addresses) received from multiple provisioning domains may be overwritten.
C. Host implementations usually do not keep separate network configurations (such as DNS server addresses) per provisioning domain.
DNS resolution
A. Some FQDNs can be resolvable only by sending queries to the right server (e.g., intranet services). However, a DNS query could be sent to the wrong interface because DNS server addresses may be node-scoped.
B. A DNS answer may be only valid on a specific provisioning domain, but applications may not be aware of that mapping because DNS answers may not be kept with the provisioning from which the answer comes.
Routing
A. In the MIF context, routing information could be specific to each interface. This could lead to routing issues because, in current node implementations, routing tables are nodescoped. E. The problem of first-hop selection could not be solved via configuration (Section 3.7), and may leverage on sophisticated and specific mechanisms (Section 3.8).
Address selection
A. Default address selection policies may be specific to their corresponding provisioning domain. However, a MIF node may not be able to manage address selection policies per provisioning domain, because default address selection policies are node-scoped.
B. On a MIF node, some source addresses are not valid if used on some interfaces or even on some default routers on the same interface. In this situation, the source address should be taken into account in the routing table, but current node implementations do not support such a feature.
C. Source address or address selection policies could be specified by applications. However, there are no advanced APIs that support such applications.
Session management and APIs
A. Some implementations, especially in the mobile world, have higher-level APIs and/or session managers (aka connection managers) to address MIF issues. These mechanisms are not standardized and do not necessarily behave the same way across different OSes and/or platforms in the presence of MIF problems. This lack of consistency is an issue for the user and operator, who could experience different session manager behaviors, depending on the terminal.
B. Session managers usually leverage on an interface to the link layer to gather information (e.g., lower-layer authentication and encryption methods) and/or for control purposes. However, such a link-layer interface may not provide all required services (e.g., may not provide all information that would allow a proper interface selection). F. Even if the node has managed to configure an interface, Internet connectivity could be unavailable. This could be due to an access control function coming into play above Layer 3, or because of poor Layer 2 conditions. An IP connectivity check should be performed before selecting an interface.
Security Considerations
The problems discussed in this document have security implications, such as when packets sent on the wrong interface might be leaking some confidential information. Configuration parameters from one provisioning domain could cause a denial of service on another provisioning domain (e.g., DNS issues). Moreover, the undetermined behavior of IP stacks in the multihomed context brings additional threats where an interface on a multihomed node might be used to conduct attacks targeted to the networks connected by the other interfaces. Corrupted provisioning domain selection policy may induce a node to make decisions causing certain traffic to be forwarded to the attacker.
